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Introduction
Negation is an important element of everyday 
communication, in which it performs a diverse array of 
functions and has different forms of expression. The most 
important of them include the volitional (e.g. I do not 
want to go to the cinema) and logical-corrective functions 
(e.g. That’s not true – our players did not lose the game 
yesterday). The latter function of negation consists in the 
reversal of meaning, declaration of falsity of someone’s 
utterance, correction of statements, or contradiction of 
something (see Maciuszek, 2018). Additionally, in everyday 
communication one of the primary functions of negation is 
to inform about the absence of certain objects (e.g. There 
are no bookcases in the house) as well as to deny events 
and behavior (Maciuszek & Polczyk, 2017). 
Negation has many functions and there are numerous 
ways to express negation, as well as different classifications 
of negation types (see Dahl, 2011). This paper concerns 
the distinction between asserted and non-asserted negation, 
which is defined respectively as explicit and implicit negation. 
As noted by Clark (1974), explicit negation (EN for short) 
is constituted by such words as no, not, never, nobody. In 
addition to negative particles (e.g. not happy), overt negation 
may be expressed by affixes (e.g. unhappy); therefore 
within explicit negation, a distinction is drawn between 
morphological (affixal) negation and sentence negation. 
Clark also includes explicitly negative quantifiers such as 
scarcely, hardly, few, seldom, little, only which do not contain 
overt negative morphology, but are considered explicit 
negation. On the other hand, implicit negation (IN for short) 
is constituted by pragmatic inferences and it may be conveyed 
using such words as forget, fail, doubt, deny (Xiang, Grove & 
Giannakidou, 2016; see also Fodor, Fodor & Garrett, 1975). 
The description of the same facts may be expressed by explicit 
or implicit negation: He did not give me my money back (EN) 
or I wish he had given me the money back (IN). The teacher 




Memory effects of implicit and explicit negation in a visual setting: 
Negation based on implicatures leads to a similar number of false memory 
alarms as overt negation
Abstract: AIMS: The primary goal of the presented research was to investigate the memory effects of implicit negation, 
conveyed using implicatures, as compared to explicit negation. We also speculated that implicit negation might require 
more cognitive effort.
METHODS: Three experiments were conducted (total N = 181), in which participants were presented with a description 
containing implicit or explicit negation, followed by a memory recognition test of items present, negated or not mentioned 
in the description. We manipulated the pace at which the description was presented (own pace vs. fixed) and whether 
participants were informed about the upcoming recognition test.
RESULTS: We found no differences between explicit and implicit negation in the number of false alarms to negated 
and not mentioned items, response times or time spent reading the source material. Bayesian analyses indicated a 90% 
probability that there were no differences in the number of false alarms between explicit and implicit negation.
CONCLUSIONS: Implicit and explicit negation lead to a similar quality of recognition, and seem to require a similar 
amount of time to process, indicating comparable cognitive effort.
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In this paper, we deal with implicit and explicit 
negation in the function of informing about the absence of 
objects, and more specifically – in the context of memory 
recognition of objects negated implicitly and explicitly. 
Our research problem concerns investigating the memory 
effects of informing about the absence of objects by means 
of asserted and non-asserted negation. Are there differences 
in cognitive load (processing difficulty) between explicitly 
negative sentences and sentences containing implicit 
negation, which are in affirmative form? Thus the main 
subject of the study is to compare memory effects of IN 
with EN and to compare select indicators of IN and EN 
processing in the context of cognitive load.
We will first present a brief introduction to implicit 
negation and review the theory and existing research on the 
relationship between implicit and explicit negation. Then 
we will report on the results of our previous studies on EN 
and IN memory effects, which have inspired current studies.
Implicit and Explicit Negation
Implicit Negation in the Context of Linguistic 
Opposition
Scientific interest in implicit and explicit negation 
seems to have been based around the problems of opposites 
of meaning (particularly the phenomenon of antonymy), 
the theory of markedness and the question of differences 
in the difficulty of processing between affirmation and 
negation. Antonyms are based on semantic negation; one 
of the segments of the antonymic pair is a denial of the 
meaning of the other segment. This denial can be visible 
in the construction of a word carrying an affix (happy vs. 
unhappy) or hidden, i.e. invisible in the morphological 
structure of the word (bad is the denial of good, and absent 
is the opposite of present). In this approach (Clark, 1974; 
Clark & Clark, 1977), words such as bad or absent are 
inherently negative, i.e. contain implicit negation.
Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975), using the terms 
“overt” and „covert” negation, distinguish four classes of 
negative morphemes: (1) explicitly negative free mor phemes, 
e.g., not, (2) explicitly negative bound morphemes (morpho-
logical negatives), e.g., un-, in, never, (3) implicitly negative 
morphemes, e.g., doubt, deny, fail, and (4) pure definitional 
negatives (PDNs). The last case concerns an observation 
that some words have a negative implicit meaning in their 
definition. For example, the word “bachelor” has such an 
implicit negative, which is equivalent to “not married”.
Implicit and Explicit Negation in the Context of Semantic 
and Pragmatic Inference 
A particular type of source of implicit negation 
is presuppositions, implications, and implicatures. 
Presuppositions and implications are two types of semantic 
information that are provided in a sentence, but are not 
expressed directly in it. The main difference between them 
is that if A presupposes B, then also not-A presupposes B, 
while if A implies B, then not-A implies not-B. Givón (1973) 
pointed to a group of verbs related to inception (e.g. began) 
and motion (e.g. enter) which carry both presuppositions 
and implications. For example, the sentences (1) John began 
to work at 9:00 includes the presupposition (2) Sometime 
before 9:00 John was not working (implicit negation), and 
the sentence (3) John still did not begin to work at 9:00 
carries the implication (4) Sometime after 9:00 John was 
not working. The negative meanings contained in sentence 
(2) and sentence (4) are not asserted in (1) and in (3). These 
are the implicit negatives. Implication is a reasoning that is 
based on logical form or semantic content (Levinson, 1983), 
whereas presuppositions are of a semantic and pragmatic 
nature. 
In everyday communication, the meaning of 
a statement must often be inferred from non-linguistic 
factors. Grice (1975) introduced the term “implicature” to 
describe the inference (which appears during conversation) 
which goes beyond the semantic content of the spoken 
words. Implicatures can be affirmative or negative. For 
example, let us consider a conversation: 
A: Where is my piece of sausage? 
B: The dog has a satisfied face. 
The answer, depending on the context, means that the 
dog ate the sausage (affirmative implicature), even though 
this fact is not directly stated in the sentence. Conversations 
can also lead to negative inferences: 
A: Will you come to the movies with me tomorrow? 
B: I have an exam tomorrow. 
This answer contains implicit negation because it 
most likely means that the person will not go to the movies. 
Here are some other examples where the implicature is an 
implicit negation. 
A: Have you called your doctor? 
B: I have lost my phone (it means implicitly that B did not 
call). 
A: Do you like the green lettuce? 
A: Am I a cow? (it means implicitly that B did not like green 
lettuce).
The various ways of conveying implicit and explicit 
negation discussed above are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Review of Select Studies
Empirical studies on implicit negation and its 
relationship with explicit negation were conducted mainly 
in the context of the phenomenon of binary opposition, and 
very few studies concerned IN as a pragmatic inference. 
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It is well known that negative statements are harder to 
verify than their affirmative counterparts. It has long been 
demonstrated that more difficult processing of sentences 
with negation concerns both EN and IN. In his seminal 
study, Clark (1974) compared the processing of explicit 
and implicit negation. In one of the experiments, the 
participants evaluated the truth or falsehood of sentences 
referring to the presented pictures. The sentences were 
affirmative or negative, and contained unmarked or marked 
words (for example: The square is present vs. The square 
is not present vs. The circle is absent vs. The circle is not 
absent). Results demonstrated that implicit negatives take 
longer to process than the corresponding affirmative. It also 
turned out that an overt sentence negation (e.g. The square 
is not present) was more difficult to process than an 
inherent (implicit) negation (eg. The circle is absent).
In Polish, research was conducted on the semantic 
complexity of dimensional adjectives (Zagrodzki, 1986). 
Inherent negation was easier to process than morphological 
negatives. It was judged more quickly whether a picture 
has a feature named by an adjective when it contained 
an inherent negation (e.g. krótki / short) rather than 
a morphological one (with affixes e.g. niekrótki / not-short). 
A similar result was found when testing the negation 
processing of adjectives, with recognition of their affective 
value (Maciuszek, 2008). Adjectives with inherent negation 
(e.g. guilty) were processed significantly faster and more 
correctly than adjectives negated using a prefix (e.g. 
immoral).
There are few studies on the processing of implicit 
negation based on pragmatic inferences. Kaup and Zwaan 
(2003) used explicit and implicit negation to inform about 
the absence of a certain color, to study the accessibility 
of the color term. It turned out that the accessibility of 
the word-probes (color terms) was similar for implicit 
and explicit negation (i.e. affirmative absent vs. negative 
absent). Moreover, in the studies carried out by Xiang et 
al. (2016), it turned out that negative information conveyed 
using asserted (EN) and non-asserted (IN) content is 
equally quickly available in online processing.
Purpose and Subject Matter of the Current Research
Studies on the relationship between implicit and 
explicit negation have employed different methods and 
materials and concerned different cognitive processes. 
Similarly to explicit negation, implicit negation is also 
more difficult to process than affirmation. The relationship 
between implicit and explicit negation is however more 
difficult to assess. Empirical studies rather seem to indicate 
that inherent negation is easier to process than sentence 
negation (Clark, 1976) and affixal negation (Maciuszek, 
2008). However, when IN was conveyed using pragmatic 
inferences, no differences between EN and IN in the 
availability of negated concepts have been registered (Kaup 
& Zwaan, 2003).
In our previous studies (Maciuszek, Polak & Sekulak, 
2019) we used implicit negation to inform participants 
about the absence of objects. With implicit negation, 
objects are not directly denied, but rather their absence 
needs to be inferred from the statement and the context 
as a pragmatic inference. The main aim was to compare 
the memory effects of explicit and implicit negation. 
The dependent variable was the number of negated items 
falsely recognized as “present”. It turned out that there were 
no differences in false alarms to negated items between 
implicit and explicit negation, both after a short (5 minute) 
and a long (one week) delay. It also turned out that in 
the group in which the absence of objects was expressed 
implicitly, a significantly higher number of false alarms 
occurred concerning objects not mentioned in the source, 
than in the group with explicit negation (both in the short 
and long delay of the memory test). We assumed that the 
higher number of false alarms to not mentioned items was 
caused by cognitive overload. The source material was an 
audio recording, so assuming that implicit negation was 
harder to process than explicit negation, participants in 
the implicit negation treatment could be less sure if they 
missed the information about not mentioned objects or if 
these objects were actually mentioned, which would lead 
to guessing and therefore to false alarms. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that implicit 
negation requires a deeper level of cognitive processing 
(to derive meaning) as compared to explicit negation, 
which could facilitate better memory retention. We were 
considering whether a combination of the effects of deeper 
cognitive processing and increased load might lead to 
a similar level of false recall (recognition of negated items 
as present in the description) for explicit and implicit 
negation. 
Our current research has two primary goals. The first 
one is to replicate our earlier results, which showed no 
difference between implicit and explicit negation in 
memory performance. The second one is to check whether 
the processing of sentences containing implicit negation 
may be associated with a higher cognitive load (i.e. is 
a more difficult task) than processing of sentences with 
explicit negation. Therefore, we conducted a series of 
three experiments aimed at testing whether any differences 
between implicit and explicit negation would occur 
(measured as memory quality and reading/response time). 
The first experiment allowed participants to read the source 
material at their own pace, to investigate whether the false 
alarms to not mentioned items, observed in the previous 
study, are attributable to overload during exposure of the 
original material containing implicit negation. Experiment 2 
was a replication of the previous study using visual stimuli 
with time constraints. Experiment 3 was constructed 
ex-post to test whether informing the participants that 
there would be a memory test would influence the time 
spent reading the source material depending on the type of 
negation (IN/EN) used. 
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to compare the effects of 
explicit and implicit negation in the source material under 
conditions in which a person has an opportunity to read 
the material at their own pace. Firstly, due to the fact that 
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implicit negation is constituted by a pragmatic meaning 
of a sentence, we assumed that the pace of processing 
sentences containing implicit negation might be slower 
as compared to explicit negation, which would indicate 
higher cognitive requirements of implicit negation. With the 
intention of testing this assumption, we decided to measure 
the time required to read the source material consisting 
of sentences which included implicit or explicit negation, 
as well as the response time to questions (in a memory 
test) about objects implicitly or explicitly negated in this 
material. Moreover, we investigated whether implicit 
and explicit negation might lead to different numbers of 
false alarms to negated items. Taking into consideration 
results from previous research (Maciuszek et al., 2019), we 
assumed that implicit negation constituted by a pragmatic 
meaning may be more difficult to process, but on the other 
hand it may cause deeper processing than explicit negation. 
Due to the fact that the depth of processing influences 
memory performance (Craik & Tulving, 1975), we wanted 
to investigate whether giving participants an opportunity to 
get familiar with a material at their own pace may result in 
a lower rate of false alarms to items negated implicitly than 
explicitly. We also expected that if IN requires more time 
to process than EN, letting participants process the source 
at their own pace should mitigate the difference in false 




Fifty-eight Polish undergraduate students voluntarily 
took part in the experiment upon informed consent. No 
remuneration was offered for participating. The sample 
consisted of 39 females and eight males, 11 participants did 
not indicate their gender. Participants were 22–25 years old 
(Mage = 22.94 years, SD = .95).
Materials
Source material. We prepared a written material in 
which the protagonist describes a newly bought house, 
which is not yet fully equipped. In the description, the 
narrator mentions objects, which are present in the building, 
as well as those which are absent. In the Explicit Negation 
group, explicit negation is used in order to inform about 
the absence of objects (e.g. “There is no garage in the 
building”). In the Implicit Negation group, the protagonist 
uses implicit negation to express the absence of items 
(e.g. “I wish there was a garage in the building”). Implicit 
negation was conveyed by means of implicatures, using 
nouns pertinent to the protagonist’s prospective actions 
(“In the future I need to add [item].”), wishes (“I wish 
there were [item].”) and/or preferences (“I would prefer if 
there were [item].”). Eighteen critical items were included 
in the description – in each variant of the material six of 
those items were mentioned as present, six objects were 
mentioned as absent, and six items were not mentioned 
at all (but were mentioned or negated in other versions 
of the material, presented to other participants). For 
counterbalancing purposes, we created 12 versions of the 
description, so that each item could appear in a different 
role (Present vs. Negated vs. Not Mentioned) and in both 
types of negation (Explicit vs. Implicit).
The source material was presented as part of 
a computerized procedure, and was shown sentence by 
sentence. Participants could read each sentence separately 
at their own pace, moving to the next sentence at the 
push of a button. There was no possibility to go back 
to the previous sentence. The amount of time spent by 
a participant reading each sentence was measured (without 
informing the participants that such a measurement is made, 
as we wanted to measure their natural pace). Depending on 
the version, the material contained 20 or 21 sentences (each 
with an average of 8.22 words). The length of equivalent 
sentences in Explicit Negation condition and Implicit 
Negation condition (measured as the number of syllables in 
the sentence) did not differ significantly (p = .207). 
Memory test. Participants were given a computerized 
recognition test containing questions about the content of 
the source material. These questions concerned the presence 
of 18 items in the building. Names of items were presented 
on-screen. Participants were to decide whether a given 
item was present or absent in the house, based solely on 
the source material. They were informed that the item 
should be classified as present only if such an information 
was directly mentioned in the material. Otherwise, the 
item should be classified as not present. Participants were 
asked to press the Left Arrow key when they recognized 
an item as present, and the Right Arrow key if an item was 
not present. Each participant was given the same memory 
test, with a fixed order of items. However, depending 
on the version of source material, each item from the 
memory test might have previously appeared as present, 
negated (explicitly or implicitly) or not mentioned in the 
description. Regardless of the version of the material, 
six items included in the memory test were mentioned as 
present in the building (Present items), so they should have 
been classified as present. The remaining 12 items should 
have been classified as not present. Out of those items, six 
were mentioned in the description as absent in the building 
(Negated items) and six items were not mentioned at all 
(Not Mentioned items). We measured the number of items 
incorrectly classified as present in the building: false alarms 
to (Implicitly or Explicitly) Negated items, and to Not 
Mentioned items. Mentioned items were included primarily 
to prevent participants from automatically classifying all 
items as Not Present, since no false alarms to Mentioned 
items were possible. 
Procedure
The procedure took place in a computer lab where 
separated workplaces had been prepared. Participants 
attended the experiment in groups of 8 to 12. Each person 
was randomly assigned to one of two conditions (Explicit 
Negation or Implicit Negation) and randomly assigned one 
of the 12 versions of the description, reflected by activating 
one of the 12 versions of the computerized procedure. 
Individuals were asked to carefully read each sentence 
in the source material before moving on to the next one. 
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However, they were not informed of the fact that the source 
material would be followed by a memory test. Having read 
the whole description, participants were provided with an 
unrelated computer task (filler) which took about 5 minutes 
and required low to moderate cognitive effort. After that, 
the memory test was run. 
Results
Number of memory errors
Two indicators of the quality of recognition were 
calculated for the Implicit Negation and Explicit Negation 
groups. The most important one was the number of false 
alarms to Explicitly Negated items and Implicitly Negated 
items (i.e. items which were stated as absent in the source 
material, but were falsely recognized as present by the 
participants in the memory test). The second one was the 
number of false alarms to Not Mentioned items (i.e. items 
which were not mentioned in the source, but recognized as 
present in the building by the participants).
It turned out that there were slightly more falsely 
recalled Negated items in the Implicit negation (M = 1.34, 
SD = 1.00) than in the Explicit negation group (M = .72, 
SD = 1.33). The difference bordered statistical significance 
at t(56) = 1.998, p = .051. Please note that additional 
Bayesian analyses investigating the probability of null 
hypotheses are conducted for all experiments, presented in 
Table 1 and further in the manuscript.
There was also a similar number of ‘Present’ answers 
to Not Mentioned items in the Implicit Negation group 
(M = 1.45, SD = 1.27) and in the Explicit Negation group 
(M = 1.52, SD = 1.55; t(56) = .185, p = .854). Results are 
presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. 
Reading and response time measures
There were no differences in mean reading time of 
individual sentences in the source material between the 
Implicit and Explicit negation groups (M = 4.19, SD = 2.02 
vs. M = 4.10, SD = 1.71 seconds per sentence; t(56) = .160, 
p = .874). Moreover, there were no correlations between 
reading time and the number of correct answers to Implicit 
Negation (r  = .051, p = .791) and to Explicit Negation 
(r = .186, p = .333). 
There were no differences between the Implicit and 
Explicit groups in answering time (per item) to Negated 
items (M = 1.75, SD = .38 for Implicit negation vs. 
M = 1.87, SD = .60 for Explicit negation; t(56) = .918, 
p = .363). Moreover, there were no correlations between 
the number of false alarms to implicitly Negated items and 
answer time to these items (r = –.040, p = .782) as well as 
between the number of false alarms to explicitly Negated 
items and answer time to these items (r = –.140, p = .348).
Summary of Experiment 1
Experiment 1 yielded a borderline-significant lower 
number of falsely recognized negated items caused by 
explicit than implicit negation. The number of falsely 
recalled Not Mentioned items was similar in both Implicit 
Negation and Explicit Negation groups. Additionally, we 
found no differences in reading time and answering time 
between implicit and explicit negation, which indicates 
either that implicit negation is not more difficult to process 
than explicit negation, or that this difficulty is not visible in 
reading and answering time. 
Since the main result was not consistent with 
expectations, Experiment 2 was planned to limit reading 
time rather than letting participants control it. The main 
aim was to replicate previous findings (Maciuszek, Polak & 
Sekulak, 2019) and to test whether the difference observed 
in the current experiment between implicit and explicit 
negation would persist under time pressure.
Experiment 2
In the Experiment 1, we found that when a person 
has an opportunity to get familiar with the source material 
under no time pressure, the explicit negation seems to lead 
to lower rate of memory errors connected with negated 
items than the implicit negation. The aim of Experiment 2 
was to compare the memory effects of explicit and implicit 
negation under time constraints, i.e. showing the source 
material at a fixed, fast rate. We assumed that if implicit 
negation is more difficult to process (due to the fact that it 
is constituted by a pragmatic meaning), pace of exposition 
the material may more strongly affect the processing of 
implicit negation than explicit negation. The assumption 
was based on the previous results showing that the implicit 
negation led to worse memory performance in case of 
not mentioned items (Maciuszek et al., 2019). When the 
source material was presented as an audio recording (as in 
the experiment described in Maciuszek et al.), participants 
had no opportunity to control the pace of presented 
information – we assumed that it might have influenced 
the difficulty of the task in the Implicit Negation group 
more than the same task in the Explicit Negation group. 
We found it possible that in the Implicit Negation group 
participants while filling in the memory test were less sure 
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if they missed the information about not mentioned objects 
or if the information about these objects actually was not 
mentioned in the material (it led to the higher rate of errors 
in the Implicit Negation group). In Experiment 2 we aimed 
to replicate the results from the previous paper (Maciuszek 
et al.) showing no differences between implicit and explicit 
negation in the number of false alarms to negated items 
and more false alarms to not mentioned items in the 
Implicit Negation than in the Explicit Negation group. We 
also measured the response time to questions related to 
objects negated implicitly or explicitly. We presumed that 
if implicit negation is more difficult to process, it might 




Sixty undergraduate Polish students (various faculties) 
voluntarily took part in the experiment upon informed 
consent. No remuneration was offered for participating. 
The sample consisted of 39 females and 13 males, eight 
participants did not indicate their gender. Participants were 
22–25 years old (Mage = 21.55 years, SD = 1.99).
Materials
Source material. The experiment used the same 
source material as Experiment 1, i.e. 12 versions of 
a description of a newly bought house, in which the 
presence / absence of 18 objects was manipulated using 
explicit or implicit negation. 
The description was presented sentence by sentence 
in a computerized procedure. However, contrary to the 
previous experiment, each sentence was shown for a fixed 
time (calculated as 75% of the median reading time of each 
sentence from the first experiment, and subsequently tested 
in a pilot study). The memory test and filler task were also 
identical to the ones in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the one in Experi-
ment 1: groups of eight to 12 participants were randomly 
assigned to one of 12 versions of the computerized task, 
which consisted of presenting the source material (fixed 
pace), followed by a filler task, and subsequently by the 
memory test. Answers to Negated and Not Mentioned items 
were recorded along with answering times.
Results
Number of memory errors
The analysis used the same two false alarm indicators 
as in Experiment 1. It turned out that the number of false 
alarms to Negated items was not statistically different 
between the Implicit (M = 2.31, SD = 1.34) and Explicit 
negation groups (M = 2.06, SD = 1.46; t(58) = .679, 
p = .500). The numbers of (incorrect) ‘Present’ answers to 
Not Mentioned items was similar in the Implicit negation 
(M = 1.86, SD = 1.36) and Explicit negation groups 
(M = 2.26, SD = 1.90, t(58) = .925, p = .359). Results are 
presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Reaction time measures
There were no differences between the Implicit and 
Explicit groups in answering time (per item) to Negated 
items (M = 1.76, SD = .63 for Implicit vs. M = 1.75, 
SD = .54 for Explicit; t(58) = .912, p = .951). There were 
also no differences in general answering time (per item) 
between the Implicit (M = 1.73, SD = .46) and Explicit 
group (M = 1.78, SD = .48, t(58) = .379, p = .706). 
Moreover, there were no correlations between the number 
of false alarms to Implicit Negation items and answer time 
to these items (r = .164, p = .394) nor between the number 
of false alarms to Explicit Negation items and answer time 
to these items (r = –.007, p = 970).
Summary of Experiment 2
As predicted, and in line with previous results 
(Maciuszek, Polak & Sekulak, 2019), we found no 
differences between implicit and explicit negation on 
the number of falsely recalled negated items. As in 
Experiment 1, the number of falsely recalled not mentioned 
items was similar in both Implicit and Explicit negation 
groups. We also found no differences in answering times 
between implicit and explicit negation. These results 
indicate that there may not be a difference between IN 
and EN in processing difficulties. It seems that at least 
under time constraints, implicit and explicit negation have 
very similar effects on memory. One possible explanation 
of why the memory of explicit negation was better than 
of implicit negation in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2 
would be that with no time pressure, participants have 
time to speculate about the procedure when reading the 
sentences. Since sentences with explicit negation are 
clearly divided into two categories (there were and there 
weren’t), it is easy to notice the difference and predict 
that subsequent steps of the procedure may be related to 
presence and absence. Implicit negation (I wish there were, 
I need to add) does not create such a clear dichotomy, 
and may rather lead some participants to focus on the 
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protagonist’s preferences and desires – resulting in a worse 
distinction of negated items. Therefore in Experiment 3 we 
decided to clearly inform participants about the presence 
and form of the memory test which would follow, and 
especially that it would require knowing which items were 
present in the house.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 did not confirm, but rather weakened, the 
hypothesis that the processing of IN is more difficult than 
that of EN. The aim of Experiment 3 was to check whether 
informing about the memory test before presenting the 
source material would influence the results of the memory 
test and reading/response times. We investigated whether 
the information about the upcoming memory test would 
make participants process sentences containing implicit 
negation slower than those with explicit negation (which 
would indicate them investing more effort to process and 
remember these sentences). We measured the reading times 
of the materials containing implicit and explicit negation, 
as well as the response times to questions about objects 
negated implicitly or explicitly. We assumed that longer 
reading and response times would indicate more cognitive 
effort. As in the previous experiments, we also aimed to 
compare the numbers of false alarms triggered by both types 
of negation. Taking into consideration that knowing about an 
upcoming memory test, participants might classify items as 
present or absent during exposure to the source material in 
both the Implicit and Explicit negation groups, we predicted 
that there would be no differences in the numbers of false 
alarms to items negated implicitly and explicitly.
Method
Participants
Sixty-three undergraduate Polish students voluntarily 
took part in the experiment upon informed consent. No 
remuneration was offered for participating. The sample 
consisted of 29 females and 13 males, 21 participants did 
not indicate their gender. Participants were 18–56 years old 
(Mage = 21.79 years, SD = 5.72). 
Materials
The materials used in Experiment 3 were identical to 
the ones used in Experiment 1 (the source material was one 
of the 12 descriptions of a newly-bought house, to be read 
by participants at their own pace sentence by sentence; the 
memory test consisted of stating the presence of 18 objects 
mentioned, negated or not mentioned in the source). In 
contrast to the previous experiments, in Experiment 3, 
prior to the presentation of the source material, participants 
were informed that the description of the building would be 
followed by a memory test related to the material, and that 
they would be asked about the presence of certain objects 
in the building. 
Procedure
The procedure in the Experiment 3 was identical 
to the previous experiments. It took place in a computer 
lab, participants attended the experiment in groups of 8 
to 12. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions (Explicit Negation or Implicit Negation 
group) and given one of 12 versions of the description. 
Participants were asked to carefully read each sentence at 
their own pace. Moreover, they were informed that as part 
of the procedure, they would be given a memory test (the 
instruction stated: Later in the experiment, there will be 
a test containing questions about the presence of various 
items in the house). After reading the source material, 
participants were given an unrelated filler task (same as in 
the previous experiments). Then, they filled out the memory 
test.
Results
Numbers of false alarms
The analysis used the same two indicators of false 
alarms as in Experiment 1 and 2. Similarly to Experiment 2, 
there were no differences in the number of false alarms 
to Negated items between the Implicit and Explicit 
negation groups (M = 1.30, SD = 1.26 in the Implicit 
vs. M = 1.12, SD = 1.39 in the Explicit negation group; 
t(61) = .533, p = .596). The numbers of false alarms to 
Not Mentioned items were similar in the Implicit negation 
groups (M = 1.33, SD = 1.40) and Explicit negation groups 
(M = 1.45, SD = 1.54, t(61) = .326, p = .745). Results are 
presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Reaction time measures
Reading time was the same for the Implicit and 
Explicit negation groups (M = 4.35, SD = 2.39 vs. 
M = 4.32, SD = 1.20, t(61) = .074, p = .941). Moreover, 
there were no correlations between reading time and the 
number of correct answers to Implicit negation (r = .051, 
p = .791) and to Explicit negation (r = .186, p = .333). 
There were no differences between the Implicit and Explicit 
groups in answering time (per item) to Negated items 
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(M = 2.07, SD = .79 for Implicit vs. M = 1.90, SD = .58 for 
Explicit; t(61) = 1.004, p = .327). 
There was no significant correlation between the 
answering time and number of false alarms to Implicit 
Negated items (r = .264, p = .158) but there was 
a significant positive correlation between the answering 
time and number of false alarms to Explicit Negated 
items (r = .414, p = .016). This effect was also visible 
in a significant positive correlation between the total 
answering time and the total number of false alarms to all 
Negated items (r = .334, p < .001).
Summary of Experiment 3
Experiment 3 yielded results consistent with expecta-
tions. There were no differences in the number of memory 
errors between implicit and explicit negation. Moreover, 
even though participants were informed about the upcoming 
memory test, no differences in reading time were observed. 
Interestingly, there were positive correlations between 
answering time and the number of false alarms to negated 
items. The more memory errors, the slower an answer 
to whether the items explicitly denied were present in the 
building (in the case of EN). This seems obvious; if someone 
does not remember the content, not only does it generate 
more errors, but also it may take much longer to think about 
the answer (trying to recall forgotten items). However, this 
result did not appear in the previous experiments, so shorter 
reaction times may have meant guessing and therefore more 
errors. As in the previous experiments, the number of falsely 
recalled Not Mentioned items was similar in both Implicit 
Negation and Explicit Negation group.
In general, the results of Experiment 3 indicate that 
messages with implicit negation do not constitute a greater 
cognitive load than messages directly informing about an 
absence (not, no).
Comparison across Experiments
A multivariate MANOVA was used to analyze the 
effects of Negation type (Explicit/Implicit), Time constraints 
(i.e. whether reading time was limited as in Experiment 2 or 
unlimited as in Experiments 1 and 3) and Informing about 
memory test (Experiment 3 vs. Experiments 1 and 2) on the 
numbers of false alarms (FA) to Negated and Not Mentioned 
items, as well as on response time (RT) to Negated and Not 
Mentioned items.
It turned out that Negation type did not have 
a significant effect on any measure across the three 
experiments (on FA to Negated items: F(1, 175) = 2.133, 
p = .146, η2p = .012; on FA to Not Mentioned items: 
F(1, 175) = .892, p = .346, η2p = .005; on RT to Negated 
items: F(1, 175) = .287, p = .593, η2p = .002; on RT to Not 
Mentioned items: F(1, 175) = 1.445, p = .231, η2p = .008). 
Warning about memory test also did not have any 
significant effect (on FA to Negated items: F(1, 175) = .545, 
p = .461, η2p = .003; on FA to Not Mentioned items: 
F(1, 175) = .103, p = .749, η2p = .001; on RT to Negated 
items: F(1, 175) = 2.625, p = .107, η2p = .015; on RT to Not 
Mentioned items: F(1, 175) = .018, p = .892, η2p < .001).
Time constraints had a significant effect on the number 
of false alarms to Negated items (M = 1.12, SE = .12 
without vs. M = 2.19, SE = .19 with time constraints; 
F(1, 175) = 22.838, p < .001, η2p = .115), on the number of 
false alarms to Not Mentioned items (M = 1.44, SE = .14 
without vs. M = 2.06, SE = .20 with time constraints; 
F(1, 175) = 4.249, p = .041, η2p = .024) and on the response 
time to Not Mentioned items (M = 2.21, SE = .07 without vs. 
M = 1.90, SE = .10 with time constraints; F(1, 175) = 4.761, 
p = .030, η2p = .026) but not on the response time to Negated 
items (F(1, 175) = .219, p = .640, η2p = .001).
All of the interaction effects were nonsignificant with 
p > .10 and were omitted for parsimony.
Bayesian Estimates of the Probability of Null 
and Alternative Hypotheses
Since many of the predicted effects in the presented 
studies concerned a lack of difference, standard NHST 
analyses were supported with Bayesian testing for null 
hypotheses (Masson, 2011). The analyses in question 
convert standard sums of squares generated by ANOVA 
into a graded level of evidence about which model (null vs. 
alternative) is more strongly supported by the data (op.cit.). 
In essence, these sums of squares are converted into Bayes 
Information Criteria (BIC) for the null and alternative 
hypotheses (cf. Wagenmakers, 2007). The final result is an 
estimated probability that the null hypothesis is true (and 
the leftover probability that the alternative hypothesis is 
true), without the need to assume arbitrary priors. 
While for Experiment 1 the probabilities of the null 
and alternative hypotheses were not clearly conclusive 
(although pointing toward the null hypothesis), data from 
Experiments 2 and 3, as well as the cumulative data from 
all experiments strongly indicates (all p(H0|D) > .75) that 
there were no differences between explicit and implicit 
negation in the numbers of memory errors. Results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Bayesian analyses of differences in the number 
of memory errors between Implicit and Explicit negation
Error type ΔBIC p(H0|D) p(H1|D)
FA to NEGATED
Experiment 1  .117 .51 .49
Experiment 2 3.611 .86 .14
Experiment 3 3.839 .87 .13
All experiments 2.573 .78 .22
FA to NOT MENTIONED
Experiment 1 4.02 .88 .12
Experiment 2 3.22 .83 .17
Experiment 3 4.03 .88 .12
All experiments 4.45 .90 .10
Note. p(H0|D) is the probability that the null hypothesis is true 
based on the data; p(H1|D) is the probability of the alternative 
hypothesis; ΔBIC is the difference in Bayes Information Criteria 
between H0 and H1 models.
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Most importantly, both the summary of the three 
experiments and the crucial Bayesian analyses provide 
strong support that implicit and explicit negation have 
very similar, if not identical effects on memory. The only 
inconclusive result was the number of false alarms to 
negated items in Experiment 1 (with 49/51 odds of the 
alternative hypothesis being true); all other results strongly 
favor the assumption that there are no differences between 
implicit and explicit negation as regards the number of 
memory errors in general (negated and not mentioned 
items), as well as the number of false alarms to negated 
items. While these results do not state that the underlying 
cognitive processes are the same for implicit and explicit 
negation, they do show that these two types of negation 
may result in the same quality of memory.
General Discussion
The current research concerned the relationship 
between IN and EN in the context of remembering objects 
the presence of which was negated either explicitly 
(sentential negation) or implicitly (implicatures). We 
checked whether implicit negation messages, which 
required drawing a conclusion about absence, cause 
a greater cognitive load than messages directly informing 
about absence (not, no). We also wanted to check if 
there were any differences between implicit and explicit 
negation in false recognition of negated items as present 
in the description. It turned out that in two out of three 
experiments there were no differences in false recognition 
between implicit negation and explicit negation.
One of the bases for the assumption of greater 
difficulty in processing implicit negation was the result 
of a previous experiment (Maciuszek et al., 2019), where 
in the group where the absence of objects was expressed 
implicitly, a significantly greater number of false memory 
alarms to objects not mentioned in the source material 
occurred than in the group with EN (both with a short 
and long memory test delay). This led us to the question 
whether the “effect of unmentioned objects” in this group 
was due to cognitive overload.
The results of the current study indicate that the 
assumption that a higher level of false memory alarms for 
not mentioned items resulted from a higher cognitive load 
when processing implicit negation than explicit negation 
should be rejected. In all experiments, the level of false 
memory alarms for unmentioned items was not significantly 
different between the group with IN and in the group with 
EN. Moreover, Bayesian analyses indicated that there is only 
a 10% chance that this difference exists. This means that 
the way of processing sentences with implicit and explicit 
negation probably did not affect the memory of objects that 
were not mentioned in the narrative (where no mention of 
the items was to be interpreted as their absence). The effect 
obtained in the previous study is to be considered an artifact.
In the present studies, we used several indicators 
to check if there is a difference between IN and EN in 
processing difficulty: results of the memory test, time spent 
reading the text, time needed to respond in the memory test. 
We also introduced additional experimental conditions: 
shortening the exposure time of the description and 
providing information about the memory test (as an attempt 
to evoke motivation for careful reading). In Experiments 1 
and 3, the participants decided at what pace they read 
the text; subsequent sentences appeared on screen at the 
press of a button. Let us remember that the participants of 
Experiment 1 and 2, while reading the source material, did 
not know that there would be a memory test afterwards, 
while the participants of Experiment 3 were notified of the 
memory test before reading the description. It turned out 
that both in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 3, the time 
spent reading the text, in which descriptions with implicit 
negation were used, was similar to the time spent reading 
the text with explicit negation. This may indicate that IN 
and EN are similarly difficult to process. Moreover, the 
information about the memory test (Experiment 3) did 
not extend the reading time at all, indicating that the pace 
at which the participants read the text in Experiment 1 
was sufficient to understand it (i.e. they did not skip over 
sentences due to a lack of motivation).
The lack of difference in processing difficulties 
between IN and EN is also indicated by the result of the 
memory test in Experiment 2, in which we shortened the 
exposure time of subsequent sentences of the description. 
It was expected that less time to read the description should 
result in a worse memory test result (more false memory 
alarms), especially for material that would be more difficult 
to process. Still, there was no difference between IN and 
EN in the memory test under these conditions.
Another variable that could indicate possible 
differences in the difficulty of IN and EN processing was 
the time needed in the memory test to respond whether an 
object was present in the described newly bought house. 
We assumed that the difficulty of recalling the presence (or 
absence) of a certain item may result in a longer response 
time in the memory test. This variable also was not different 
between these two types of negation. In each of the three 
experiments, participants exposed to EN and IN did not 
significantly differ in the time needed to decide whether 
a negated object (explicitly or implicitly) was present in the 
described building. This result supports earlier conclusions 
about the lack of difference in processing difficulty between 
implicit negation and explicit negation.
We also checked if there is a positive correlation 
between the response time to memory test questions and the 
number of false memory alarms (i.e. whether the response 
time in the memory test can be an indicator of difficulties 
remembering an item). In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
the response time to memory test items did not correlate 
with memory test results, both for IN and EN. However, 
in Experiment 3, in the EN group, there was a significant 
positive correlation between the response time in the 
memory test and the number of false memory alarms (the 
slower the response, the more memory errors). The longer 
decision-making time may (but does not have to) point to 
a problem with item memory. However, shorter response 
times can also mean guessing and therefore lead to more 
errors. Thus, our results do not clearly indicate the pattern 
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of the relationship between the decision time and the 
memory test results and the response time in the memory 
test does not indicate processing difficulties.
Propositional theories of comprehension (e.g. Clark & 
Chase, 1972) state that comprehension of negation requires 
creating a propositional representation of it. Negation 
is treated as an explicit operator, which triggers taking 
the whole sentence into its scope. As a result, processing 
a sentence with negation is more complex than processing 
an affirmation. According to the propositional models, 
the complexity of comprehension of a negation makes the 
process slower and prone to more mistakes. In contrast, the 
experiential-simulation model (Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Kaup, 
Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan & Lüdtke, 2007) is based on the 
claim that the comprehension of a negation is connected with 
non-linguistic cognitive processes rather than operations on 
sentences. According to the model, processing a negation 
is based on mental simulations of the states of affairs 
described in the sentence. In terms of the propositional 
model, implicit negation based on a pragmatic meaning (the 
one we examined in the current study) should be treated as 
an affirmation (because negation is not overtly expressed 
in the syntax of the sentence). As a result, using an implicit 
negation to inform about an absence should trigger different 
effects than the usage of explicit negation. However, in terms 
of the experiential-simulation model, implicit negation and 
explicit negation may be similar, because both of them 
cause a similar simulation of the actual situation. Since 
we did not find any key differences between the memory 
effects of implicit negation and explicit negation, it seems 
that the results of our research are more consistent with the 
experiential-simulation model than the propositional model. 
This model is also supported by other research (Kaup & 
Zwaan, 2003), in which concepts present in the actual state 
of affairs were more cognitively available than concepts 
absent from the state of affairs, regardless of the type of 
negation used to express the absence. It seems that when it 
comes to memory effects, the simulation of actual state of 
affairs may be the key process influencing comprehension 
and remembering the information about absence included in 
both explicit negation and the implicit negation. 
As we noted in the Introduction, most studies have 
shown that processing negation is more difficult than 
processing affirmative statements. This also applies to 
remembering – sentences with negation often turn out to be 
more difficult to remember than affirmative ones. It should 
also be stressed that over the last few years, many studies 
have shown that the difficulty in processing negation can 
be alleviated by pragmatics and different semantic contexts 
(Dale & Duran, 2011; Giora, 2016; Tian, Breheny, & 
Ferguson, 2010; Orenes, Moxey, Scheepers, & Santamaría, 
2016). These discoveries seem particularly interesting in 
the case of the study of implicit negation processing, which 
is generated by pragmatic inferences. In future studies, we 
will attempt to study the dependence of IN processing on 
various pragmatic and semantic factors.
The general conclusion form the present study is 
that despite the significant linguistic differences between 
explicit negation and implicit negation, and despite implicit 
negation requiring pragmatic inference, these two types of 
negation lead to a very similar quality of memory.
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